Background: Patient safety culture is measured using a range of survey tools. Many provide limited data on psychometric properties and few report findings outside of the USA healthcare context. This study reports an assessment of the psychometric properties and suitability of the American Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPC) for use within the UK.
Introduction
The measurement of patient safety culture is a growing industry amongst researchers and healthcare professionals [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . In the UK at least a third of NHS Trusts are taking part in some form of culture assessment 7 . Measurement methods range from more generic 'toolkits' through to methods designed for specific healthcare contexts (e.g., primary care) 8, 9 . Questionnaire surveys are frequently used to measure, for example, team working, attitudes towards errors and general perceptions of safety. However, it has been suggested that many questionnaires lack explicit theoretical underpinning and fail to report the full psychometric properties of measures 10, 11 , raising the possibility that they neither consistently measure specific aspects of patient safety, nor generalise across different national and healthcare-specific environments 2 . In this paper, we report the use within the UK of the American Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) sponsored Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPC)
questionnaire.
The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture
The HSOPC questionnaire is based upon a set of pilot studies carried out in 21 different hospitals involving 1,437 hospital staff across the USA. 12 As a result of a series of item and content analyses, reliability analysis and exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, it consists of 42 items which group into 12 dimensions; 2 outcome dimensions and 10 safety dimensions. For each item there were 5 possible response categories, the labeling of which varies across dimensions. Of the 42 items, 17 are asked from a "negative" viewpoint, and are subsequently reverse-scored. The confirmatory factor analysis carried out during the development of the questionnaire indicated that the 12 factor model proposed had an adequate level of fit to the data using established criteria, 13 
Method

The sample
The HSOPC questionnaire was distributed to three hospitals within a large NHS 
Changes made to the questionnaire
As a result of pre-survey group discussions with staff members, a number of changes were made. These included adjustments to the wording of individual items with respect to terminology used within UK. The words "area" and "unit" were changed to "ward" and "department" (affecting questions A28, A1, A7, A20, A12, F4, F13, F2, F7, F3, F9) and the term "adverse outcome" was used to substitute for "error" and "mistake" (questions D1, D2, D3, C7, C9). The words "over and over" in question B4 were replaced by "repeatedly". In addition, following discussions with hospital management, one item (question A19) in the "non-punitive responses to error" dimension was removed from the questionnaire.
Finally, due to a proof-reading error, the meaning of one item (question F1) in the "Hospital management support for patient safety" dimension was altered. This item was subsequently discarded because of this change of meaning, resulting in 40 items used in our data analyses as compared to 42 from the original HSOPC survey (table 1) . The survey also collected a small amount of background information, specifically on respondents' hospital, job type and tenure. 
Patient safety is never sacrificed to get the work done Our procedures and systems are good at preventing errors from happening It is just by chance that serious mistakes don't happen around here We have patient safety problems in this ward/department Frequency of error reporting (outcome dimension) When an event occurs, but is caught and identified before affecting the patient, how often is it reported? When an event occurs, but it has no adverse outcome to the patient, how often is it reported? When an event occurs that could have an adverse outcome to the patient but does not, how often is it reported? Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety My supervisor/manager provides positive feedback when he/she sees a job done according to established patient safety procedures My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff suggestions for improving patient safety Whenever pressure build up, my supervisor/manager wants us to work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts My supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems that happen repeatedly Organisational learning -continuous improvement We are actively doing things to improve patient safety Mistakes have led to positive changes around here After we make changes to patient safety, we evaluate their effectiveness Teamwork within units People support one another in this ward/department When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work together as a team to get the work done In this ward/department, people treat each other with respect When one area in this ward/department gets busy, others help out Communication openness Staff will freely speak up if they see something that may negatively affect patient care Staff feel free to question the decisions and actions of those with more authority Staff are afraid to ask questions where something doesn't seem right Feedback and communication about error We are given feedback about changes put into place based on event reports
We are informed about events that happen in this ward/department 
In this ward/department, we discuss ways to prevent events from happening again Non-punitive response to error When an event is reported, it feels like the person is being written up, not the problem Staff feel that their mistakes are held against them Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personal files Staffing We have enough staff to handle the workload Staff in this ward/department work longer hours that is best for patient care We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for patient care We often work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, too quickly Hospital management support for patient safety Hospital management provides a work climate that promotes patient safety The actions of hospital management show that patient safety is a top priority Hospital management seems interested in patient safety only after an adverse event happens Teamwork across hospital units There is good cooperation across hospital wards/departments that need to work together Hospital wards/departments work well together to provide the best care for patients Hospital wards/departments do not coordinate well with each other It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other hospital wards/departments Hospital handoffs/transitions Things "fall between the cracks" when transferring patients from one ward/department to another Important patient care information is often lost during shift changes Problems often occur in the exchange of information across hospital wards/departments Shift changes are problematic for patients in this hospital ________________________________________ * Item changed from original HSOPC questionnaire + Item not used in the questionnaire or discarded from the analysis
Survey response and sample properties
Four thousand questionnaires were distributed, of which 1,461 were returned (a 37% response rate representing 12% of the total employees in the Trust). Within these cases, 1017 respondents had given valid responses to the 40 HSOPC items subsequently analysed. Sixty percent of the sample were nursing staff (trained and untrained), followed by allied healthcare professionals (21%), management and administrative staff (11%) and medical staff (8%); just under half the sample (45%) had been working in their current hospital for at least 5 years.
Analysis of data
We first examined the responses made to each item within the 12 HSOPC dimensions, and assessed the original 12 dimension model in relation to our sample, both in terms of the internal consistency reliability of each dimensional grouping of items, and as a whole using confirmatory factor analysis to assess the overall level of fit.
We then constructed the optimal measurement model for our sample to see if, and how this differed from the original model. Our sample was split randomly into two halves; on one "construction" half, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to construct a measurement model for the items; the other "validation" half of the data was then used to test this model via Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Having finalized our optimal model, we then performed reliability analysis on the sets of items in each resulting dimension using the whole sample.
Results
Item responses
With the exception of two factors (i.e., hospital handover handoffs and transitions), the main findings were positive with regard to the type of safety 
Constructing an optimal model
Having found that the original model did not fit the UK data satisfactorily, we then carried out a robust construction of the optimal measurement model for the 40 HSOPC items in the UK survey. On one randomly selected "construction" half of the data we performed an EFA, using Principal Axis Factoring as the extraction method, and assessing the number of factors to be extracted by a combination of Kaiser's criterion and Cattell's screen plot method 15 . An oblique rotation was carried out to aid interpretation of the resulting factors. Having examined a series of possible models, and gradually removed 13 items which either severely crossloaded or had very low loadings and communalities, the evidence pointed most strongly towards a 9-factor model for the remaining 27 items. This accounted for 66.8% of their total variance, and is given with the factor loadings in Appendix 2.
We then tested the fit of this model to the other "validation" half of the dataset using CFA (chi-square = 588, 288 df). The fit indices suggested an adequate fit to the data, with CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.04. Furthermore, the model accounted for at least 20% of the variance of each item, and greater than 30% of the variance for all but 2 items. All but one of the factor loadings from the EFA and all 27standardized path coefficients from the CFA were above 0.5.
The interpretations of the dimensions resulting from the optimal measurement model constructed and tested on the UK data were similar to those from the original model. Indeed, there still existed dimensions for "Communication openness", "Feedback, frequency of event reporting", "Non-punitive responses to error" and "Hospital handoffs and transitions", which all formed as before. The dimensions for "Teamwork across units" and Teamwork within units" both dropped a single item, and the "Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety" dimensions dropped two items. The most noticeable differences were the absence of "Organisational learning -continuous improvement" and "Hospital management support", and the grouping of a subset of the items which previously formed the "Overall perceptions of safety" and "Staffing" dimensions into a single dimension.
Finally, using the whole sample, reliability analyses were performed for each of the groups of items defined by this factor structure. These generally indicated suitable internal consistency, with Cronbach's alpha > 0.7 for seven of the nine dimensions. Of the two dimensions that fell below this level, one was a 2-item scale, and both were among the five dimensions to survive unchanged from the original model (i.e. the weak reliability was not due to the form of our revised model). None of the scales gained improved consistency by dropping further items.
Discussion and conclusions
Our findings differ from the results obtained within the USA. Whilst we might have expected the changes made to the UK questionnaire to have resulted in some differences, they are unlikely by themselves to explain the findings. The results from the spilt EFA and CFA indicate that the questionnaire may be measuring different constructs, or aspects of patient safety within the UK, as compared to the USA. For example, the optimal model derived from the UK data resulted in a dimension that linked "Overall perceptions of safety" and "Staffing". This may have come about because of an increased tendency to associate staffing levels with safety within the UK as compared to the USA. Similarly, it is possible that the items in the dimensions "Organisational learning -continuous improvement"
and "Hospital management support for patient safety" may have been interpreted differently within a UK sample. Our findings indicate that national and health care-specific differences may limit the extent to which the HSOPC survey is applicable outside of the USA. We would also point to the lack of cross-validation (EFA followed by CFA) in the USA dataset as indicating another potential flaw in the design and validation of the HOSPC questionnaire. The relatively higher values for the CFA fit indices achieved in the original study from which the HSOPC scales were constructed may be partially explained by their use of the same sample for the EFA and CFA. Split-half validation was not undertaken; and testing the model using the same data from which it was constructed would most likely result in an over-estimate of the degree of fit.
The measurement of safety culture and climate in healthcare is still in a relatively immature stage of development as compared to other domains (e.g., offshore installations, manufacturing) 16, 17 . Other researchers 3 have warned about the dangers of too readily generalising about safety culture and climate across industries with widely differing characteristics, forms of hierarchy and work practices. This is especially the case within health care, where hospitals for example, may vary greatly according to norms and operating procedures, even within the same Trust. Our findings add further weight to the argument that there is a need to further develop and construct theoretical models that are sensitive to the context-specific nature of health care environments including hospitals. 18 Without such work researchers run the risk of adopting a "broad brush" approach to safety culture and overgeneralising their findings.
